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Abstract: Currently, string theory represents the only advanced approach to a
uniﬁcation of all interactions, including gravity. In spite of the more than thirty
years of its existence, the sequence of metamorphosis it ran through, and the ever
more increasing number of involved physicists, until now, it did not make any em-
pirically testable predictions. Because there are no empirical data incompatible
with the quantum ﬁeld theoretical standard model of elementary particle physics
and with general relativity, the only motivations for string theory rest in the mu-
tual incompatibility of the standard model and of general relativity as well as in
the metaphysics of the uniﬁcation program of physics, aimed at a ﬁnal uniﬁed
theory of all interactions including gravity. But actually, it is completely unknown
which physically interpretable principles could form the basis of string theory. At
the moment, string theory is no theory at all, but rather a labyrinthic structure
of mathematical procedures and intuitions which get their justiﬁcation from the
fact that they, at least formally, reproduce general relativity and the standard
model of elementary particle physics as low energy approximations. However,
there are now strong indications that string theory does not only reproduce the
dynamics and symmetries of our standard model, but a plethora of diﬀerent sce-
narios with diﬀerent low energy nomologies and symmetries. String theory seems
to describe not only our world, but an immense landscape of possible worlds. So
far, all attempts to ﬁnd a selection principle which could be motivated intrathe-
oretically remained without success. So, recently the idea that the low energy
nomology of our world, and therefore also the observable phenomenology, could
be the result of an anthropic selection from a vast arena of nomologically diﬀer-
ent scenarios entered string theory. Although multiverse scenarios and anthropic
selection are not only motivated by string theory, but lead also to a possible ex-
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planation for the ﬁne tuning of the universe, they are concepts which transcend
the framework deﬁned by the epistemological and methodological rules which
conventionally form the basis of physics as an empirical science.
Keywords: Uniﬁcation, Quantum Gravity, String theory, Superstrings, Multiverse
Scenario, Anthropic Selection
1 The Physics and the Metaphysics of Uniﬁcation
Since pre-socratic philosophy of nature, a central and dominant philosophical idea
belongs to the metaphysical background of our attempts to understand nature.
It is the idea that nature is a unity; that it does not exhaust itself in the plurality
of phenomena that it might appear to be at ﬁrst glance. In form of mathe-
matical and theoretical concretizations, this metaphysical idea of unity, together
with ontological reductionism, was of eminent importance for the development
of modern physics, especially for the theoretical constructs of contemporary high
energy physics. Its most advanced expression can be found in the program of a
nomological uniﬁcation of all fundamental interactions.1
A more moderate variant is conceptual uniﬁcation. Its goal is to make at least
compatible with each other the diﬀerent theoretical drafts of our intended de-
scription of nature by eliminating contradictions in their respective results and
in their prevailing requirements. It would be most interesting, if it turned out
that, on the most fundamental physical level, a minimal conceptual and model
theoretical uniﬁcation can only be achieved at the prize of an all-encompassing
nomological uniﬁcation.
Many successful examples of conceptual as well as of nomological uniﬁcations can
be found in the history of physics. With Newtonian physics the old separation
into terrestrial and celestial mechanics was overcome. With Maxwell's electrody-
namics the nomological uniﬁcation of electricity, magnetism and optics could be
achieved. The Einsteinian theories of relativity established the compatibility of
mechanics, classical electrodynamics and, ﬁnally, gravitation.
Now, with the standard model of quantum ﬁeld theory we have a theoretical
construct at our disposal which achieves, at least conceptually, the uniﬁcation
of all fundamental forces: electromagnetic, weak, and strong - with one crucial
exception: gravity. A ﬁnal inclusion of gravity seems to be unattainable within
the framework of quantum ﬁeld theory. The apparatus of quantum mechanics
and quantum ﬁeld theory turns out to be conceptually incompatible with the
theory of general relativity.2
1 Cf. Weinberg (1992).
2 A theory of quantum gravity in the sense of a direct implementation of gravity
into the quantization program of quantum ﬁeld theory seems to lead unavoidably to non-
renormalizability, caused by the self-interaction of the gravitons, or the non-linearity of general
relativity respectively. This should be no great surprise, because it will hardly be possible to
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However, all systems of nature, without any exception, are subject to gravity;
and as soon as we think of all systems of nature as quantum systems, the incom-
patibility of quantum mechanics and general relativity is a fundamental problem.
It may be true that we can ignore this problem for many microscopic as well as
for many macroscopic systems: for electrons, gravity can generally be considered
as irrelevant, as well as quantum eﬀects can be ignored for planets. But for black
holes and for the assumed high-density state of matter at the beginning of cos-
mic expansion the problem gets virulent. Here the areas of relevance of the two
incompatible theoretical constructs which presently form our most advanced and
most fundamental apparatus of physics are overlapping. Gravitational as well as
quantum eﬀects are crucially relevant. Neither general relativity nor quantum
ﬁeld theory alone is suﬃcient for the description of the physical phenomena in
this overlap area.3
quantize gravity - in general relativity identiﬁed with the metrics of dynamical Riemannian
geometry - on the ﬂat, static Minkowski background spacetime of quantum ﬁeld theory. Such a
procedure will certainly not lead to the desired result. The idea of a quantization of dynamical
spacetime (gravity) on the static background spacetime of quantum ﬁeld theory means simply
a conceptual contradiction.
3 So, for example, the formation of black holes can be understood, at least partially, within
the context of general relativity. According to general relativity the gravitational collapse leads
to a spacetime singularity. But this spacetime singularity can not be adequately described
within general relativity, because the equivalence principle of general relativity is not valid for
spacetime singularities; therefore, general relativity does not give a complete description of
black holes. The same problem exists with regard to the postulated initial singularity of the
expanding cosmos. In these cases, quantum mechanics and quantum ﬁeld theory also reach their
limit; they are not applicable for highly curved spacetimes. For a certain curving parameter
(the famous Planck scale), gravity has the same strength as the other interactions; then it is not
possible to ignore gravity in the context of a quantum ﬁeld theoretical description. So, there
exists no theory which would be able to describe gravitational collapses or which could explain,
why (although they are predicted by general relativity) they don't happen, or why there is no
spacetime singularity.
And the real problems start, if one brings general relativity and quantum ﬁeld theory together
to describe black holes. Then it comes to rather strange forms of contradictions, and the mutual
conceptual incompatibility of general relativity and quantum ﬁeld theory becomes very clear:
Black holes are according to general relativity surrounded by an event horizon. Material
objects and radiation can enter the black hole, but nothing inside its event horizon can leave
this region, because the gravitational pull is strong enough to hold back even radiation; the
escape velocity is greater than the speed of light. Not even photons can leave a black hole.
- Black holes have a mass; in the case of the Schwarzschild metrics, they have exclusively a
mass. In the case of the Reissner-Nordström metrics, they have a mass and an electric charge;
in case of the Kerr metrics, they have a mass and an angular momentum; and in case of the
Kerr-Newman metrics, they have mass, electric charge and angular momentum. These are,
according to the no-hair theorem, all the characteristics a black hole has at its disposal.
Let's restrict the argument in the following to the Reissner-Nordström metrics in which a
black hole has only mass and electric charge. In the classical picture, the electric charge of
a black hole becomes noticeable in form of a force exerted on an electrically charged probe
outside its event horizon. In the quantum ﬁeld theoretical picture, interactions are the result of
the exchange of virtual interaction bosons, in case of an electric charge: virtual photons. But
how can photons be exchanged between an electrically charged black hole and an electrically
charged probe outside its event horizon, if no photon can leave a black hole - which can be
considered a deﬁnition of a black hole? One could think, that virtual photons, mediating
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Without a theory of quantum gravity a solution to these problems is unachiev-
able. And it is string theory (more exactly: superstring theory4) which promises
to close this gap. String theory, incomplete as it might be, is presently the
most advanced attempt at an inclusion of gravity into the uniﬁcation program of
electrical interaction, are possibly able (in contrast to real photons, representing radiation) to
leave the black hole. But why? There is no good reason and no good answer for that within
our present theoretical framework. The same problem exists for the gravitational interaction,
for the gravitational pull of the black hole exerted on massive objects outside its event horizon,
if the gravitational force is understood as an exchange of gravitons between massive objects,
as the quantum ﬁeld theoretical picture in its extrapolation to gravity suggests. How could
(virtual) gravitons leave a black hole at all?
There are three possible scenarios resulting from the incompatibility of our assumptions about
the characteristics of a black hole, based on general relativity, and on the picture quantum ﬁeld
theory draws with regard to interactions:
1. Black holes don't exist in nature. They are a theoretical artifact, demonstrating the
asymptotic inadequacy of Einstein's general theory of relativity. Only a quantum theory
of gravity will explain where the general relativistic predictions fail, and why.
2. Black holes exist, as predicted by general relativity, and they have a mass and, in some
cases, an electric charge, both leading to physical eﬀects outside the event horizon. Then,
we would have to explain, how these eﬀects are realized physically. The quantum ﬁeld
theoretical picture of interactions is either fundamentally wrong, or we would have to
explain, why virtual photons behave completely diﬀerent, with regard to black holes,
from real radiation photons. Or the features of a black hole - mass, electric charge and
angular momentum - would be features imprinted during its formation onto the spacetime
surrounding the black hole or onto its event horizon. Then, interactions between a black
hole and its environment would rather be interactions between the environment and
the event horizon or even interactions within the environmental spacetime. Our present
theories do not support this picture.
3. Black holes exist as the product of gravitational collapses, but they do not exert any
eﬀects on their environment. This is the craziest of all scenarios. For this scenario,
general relativity would have to be fundamentally wrong. In contrast to the picture
given by general relativity, black holes would have no physically eﬀective features at all:
no mass, no electric charge, no angular momentum, nothing. And after the formation
of a black hole, there would be no spacetime curvature, because there remains no mass.
(Or, the spacetime curvature has to result from other eﬀects.) The mass and the electric
charge of objects falling (casually) into a black hole would be irretrievably lost. They
would simply disappear from the universe, when they pass the event horizon. Black holes
would not exert any forces on massive or electrically charged objects in their environment.
They would not pull any massive objects into their event horizon and increase thereby
their mass. Moreover, their event horizon would mark a region causally disconnected
with our universe: a region outside of our universe. Everything falling casually into the
black hole, or thrown intentionally into this region, would disappear from the universe.
A decision between these scenarios will only be achievable within the context of a new theory
which overcomes the incompatibility between general relativity and quantum ﬁeld theory. The
same is valid for some further eminent problems and questions with regard to black holes: the
Bekenstein-Hawking entropy of black holes and the microstates from which it might result, the
spectrum of Hawking radiation, the information loss problem and the corresponding question
concerning the conservation of quantum mechanical unitarity, etc.
4 See below.
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physics.5 Conceptually, an all-encompassing uniﬁcation seems to be feasible with
it. And, if string theory should be successful, it would be the ideal rationale for the
aforementioned idea that, possibly, a minimal conceptual and model-theoretical
uniﬁcation will only be achievable at the prize of an all-encompassing nomological
uniﬁcation.
But, in some ways, with string theory we have a new situation for physics: a
situation in which many of the common argumentational and methodological
procedures of the empirical sciences seem to become, at least partially, inade-
quate. There are some hints that the uniﬁcation program of physics with string
theory as its possibly ﬁnal stage transcends the context of physics and of the
empirical sciences.6
2 Superstrings
Superstring theories are supersymmetric string theories.7 Supersymmetry is a
symmetry relation between bosons (interaction quanta) and fermions (matter
particles). It encompasses the Poincaré invariance of spacetime as well as the
gauge symmetries of quantum ﬁeld theory. With supersymmetry, string theory
postulates hitherto unobserved supersymmetric partners to the particles (and
quanta) of the standard model of particle physics. However, in string theory, the
basic constituents of matter are not any longer matter particles and interaction
quanta, but one-dimensional oscillating entities: strings. Matter particles and
interaction quanta are taken to be the basic, approximately massless oscillation
modes of the string.
5 The main competitor to string theory for the status of an emerging theory of quantum
gravity is Loop Quantum Gravity. As an oﬀspring of the canonical quantization program,
loop quantum gravity is a non-perturbative quantum theory of gravitation, or of geometry
respectively. No uniﬁcation of the forces is intended with loop quantum gravity. Cf. Rovelli
(2004).
With regard to the incompleteness of both approaches to quantum gravity, Craig Callender
and Nick Huggett note in the introduction to their anthology Physics meets Philosophy at the
Planck Scale:
We should emphasize at the outset that currently there is no quantum theory of
gravity in the sense that there is, say, a quantum theory of gauge ﬁelds. 'Quantum
gravity' is merely a placeholder for whatever theory or theories eventually manage
to bring together our theory of the very small, quantum mechanics, with our
theory of the very large, general relativity. [...] However, there do exist many
more-or-less developed approaches to the task - especially superstring theory and
canonical quantum gravity. (Callender/Huggett 2001, p. 3).
6 Cf. Hedrich (2002a) und Hedrich (2002c).
7 A systematical introduction to string theory can be found in Polchinski (2000); Kaku
(1999); Lüst/Theisen (1989) and Green/Schwarz/Witten (1987). For recent developments, see
especially Lerche (2000); Schwarz (2000); Dienes (1997) and Vafa (1997). The early development
of string theory is reﬂected in a commented collection of original articles: Schwarz (1985).
Greene (1999) gives a recommendable popular introduction.
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One of these basic oscillation modes of the string corresponds to a spin-2 particle
which can be identiﬁed with the graviton, the interaction quantum of gravity.
Only its discovery made string theory a candidate for a uniﬁed theory of all
interactions, including gravity.8
Forced by intratheoretical consistency requirements (Lorentz invariance, unitar-
ity etc.), the hitherto developed formulations of superstring theory embed the
dynamics of the string into a ten-dimensional spacetime.9 But, our common
spacetime has only four dimensions. One of the solutions to this problem con-
sists in the idea that the six surplus dimensions are comfactiﬁed microscopi-
cally in form of so-called Calabi-Yau Spaces.10 An alternative idea consists
in treating all dimensions as macroscopically extended and assuming that open
strings, whose oscillation modes represent in this picture matter particles (and
ourselves), are connected to Dirichlet-branes.11 Our observable universe would be
a three-dimensional D-brane developing in time within a ten-dimensional space-
time. Only gravitons, as oscillation modes of closed strings, would move freely
within this ten-dimensional spacetime. But, at the moment, this is merely a
speculation.
However, the serious problems of string theory are of a diﬀerent kind. On the
one hand, although string theory exists since more than thirty years, it does not
provide the least numerical results which could be used for an empirical test of
the theoretical framework.
8 It can also be expected that with the transition from point particles to strings the non-
renormalizability of the earlier quantum ﬁeld theoretical treatments of gravity should be avoid-
able.
9 There are ﬁve diﬀerent perturbation-theoretical formulations of ten-dimensional super-
symmetric string theory. M-Theory, a non-perturbative eleven-dimensional extrapolation from
these ﬁve string theories, is not much more than a research program. Cf. Duﬀ (1996); Schwarz
(1996); Schwarz (1997); Sen (1998) and Banks et al. (1997). Edward Witten, one of the most
prominent protagonists of string theory, wrote in 1997 with regard to M-Theory (Witten 1997,
p. 32):
The novelty of the last couple of years, in a nutshell, is that we have learned
that the strong-coupling behavior of supersymmetric string theories and ﬁeld the-
ories is governed by a web of dualities relating diﬀerent theories. When one
description breaks down because a coupling parameter becomes large, another
description takes over. [...] we learn that the diﬀerent theories are all one. The
diﬀerent supertheories studied in diﬀerent ways in the last generation are diﬀerent
manifestations of one underlying, and still mysterious, theory, sometimes called
M-theory, where M stands for magic, mystery or membrane, according to taste.
This theory is the candidate for superuniﬁcation of the forces of nature.
According to this picture, the ﬁve superstring theories are seen as diﬀerent perturbative ap-
proximations to M-Theory. This assumption is based on the duality relations, mentioned by
Witten and discovered between 1990 and 1995, which establish, under certain compactiﬁcation
and coupling parameter transitions, structural identities between the spectra of the oscilla-
tory states of diﬀerent perturbative formulations of string theory. These dualities reinforced
signiﬁcantly the uniqueness idea in string theory. See Ch. 3.
10 Cf. Greene (1997).
11 Cf. Polchinski (1996a); Polchinski (1996b); Polchinski/Chaudhuri/Johnson (1996); Dou-
glas (1996) and Bachas (1997).
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The approximate equations that string theorists currently use are not
powerful enough to work out the resulting physics fully for any choice
of Calabi-Yau shape. [...] precise and deﬁnitive physical conclusions,
such as the mass of the electron or the strength of the weak force,
require equations that are far more exact than the present approx-
imate framework. [...] the 'natural' energy scale of string theory is
the Planck energy, and it is only through extremely delicate cancella-
tions that string theory yields vibrational patterns with masses in the
vicinity of those of the known matter and force particles. (Greene
1999, p. 220).
On the other hand, not the least idea does exist with regard to a fundamental prin-
ciple which could serve as basis, as physical motivation and as model-theoretical
starting point for the development of the theory. In contrast, general relativity
and its spacetime structure, into which gravity is implemented, can be under-
stood as consequences of the principle of equivalence; the dynamics described by
quantum ﬁeld theories is based on local gauge invariance. No such principle is
known for string theory:
Ironically, although superstring theory is supposed to provide a uni-
ﬁed ﬁeld theory of the Universe, the theory itself often seems like a
confused jumble of folklore, random rules of thumb, and intuitions.
This is because the development of superstring theory has been unlike
that of any other theory [...]. Superstring theory [...] has been evolv-
ing backward for the past 30 years. It has a bizarre history [...]. [...]
physicists have ever since been trying to work backward to fathom the
physical principles and symmetries that underlie the theory. [...] the
fundamental physical and geometrical principles that lie at the foun-
dation of superstring theory are still unknown. (Kaku 1999, pp. vii).
The story of string theory is not easy to tell, because even now we do
not really know what string theory is. We know a great deal about it,
enough to know that it is something really marvelous. We know much
about how to carry out certain kinds of calculations in string theory.
Those calculations suggest that, at the very least, string theory may be
part of the ultimate quantum theory of gravity. But we do not have a
good deﬁnition of it, nor do we know what its fundamental principles
are. (It used to be said that string theory was part of twenty-ﬁrst
century mathematics that had fallen by luck into our hands in the
twentieth century. This does not sound quite as good now as it used
to.) The problem is that we do not yet have string theory expressed
in any form that could be that of a fundamental theory. What we
have on paper cannot be considered to be the theory itself. What we
have is no more than a long list of examples of solutions of the theory;
what we do not yet have is the theory they are solutions of. It is as
if we had a long list of solutions to the Einstein equations, without
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knowing the basic principles of general relativity or having any way
to write down the actual equation that deﬁnes the theory. / Or, to
take a simpler example, string theory in its present form most likely
has the same relationship to its ultimate form as Kepler's astronomy
had to Newton's physics. (Smolin 2000, pp. 149).
3 Uniqueness
Although a fundamental, physically interpretable principle which should form the
basis of string theory is still unknown, and although it is not even clear, if such
a principle exists at all, string theorists have emphasized all the time the inter-
nal mathematical coherence of their theoretical construct, making plausible this
coherence with the fact that most of the apparent mathematical alternatives for
the formulation of the theory proved to be inconclusive because of the occurrence
of mathematical, physical and conceptual anomalies. This postulated coherence
has been used as an argument for the uniqueness of the theoretical approach.
[...] the uniﬁcation of the forces is accomplished in a way determined
almost uniquely by the logical requirement that the theory be inter-
nally consistent. (Green 1986, p. 44).
But the crucial step in this argumentation consists in taking logical and concep-
tual coherence (an indispensable requirement for every theory) as suﬃcient to
establish the adequacy of a postulated theoretical description of nature.
I believe that we have found the unique mathematical structure that
consistently combines quantum mechanics and general relativity. So
it must almost certainly be correct. (Schwarz 1998, p. 2).
In this argumentation, empirical testability seems to be irrelevant. This is under-
standable, at least strategically, for a theoretical approach which, after more than
thirty years of development, does not provide of any empirically testable results.12
12 Although the coherence-to-uniqueness-to-adequacy argument is used in string theory for
the ﬁrst time as a direct substitute for empirical control, it existed even before string theory. It
was, though never used as a substitute for empirical control, at least partially apparent already
in general relativity and in quantum ﬁeld theory.
Although this contingency of physical laws has been the point of view adopted by
most modern scientists, there have been some attempts even in the present century
to show that physical laws are unique and necessary or that certain apparently
contingent general features of the world are in fact necessary. (Cushing 1985,
p. 33).
Cushing saw in this tendency the ﬁrst indications of a possible metamorphosis with regard
to our understanding of scientiﬁc methodology and the criteria of scientiﬁc justiﬁcation.
The general scheme remains hypothetico-deductive, but the coherence constraint
becomes much tighter. (Cushing 1985, p. 32).
In string theory, the coherence-to-uniqueness-to-adequacy argument now has reached ﬁnally
its climax.
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But it should not exclusively be understood as a strategic move. Moreover, at a
closer look, one can see what metaphysical intuitions form the background of the
uniqueness idea:
In his long search for a uniﬁed theory, Einstein reﬂected on whether
'God could have made the Universe in a diﬀerent way; that is, whether
the necessity of logical simplicity leaves any freedom at all.' With this
remark, Einstein articulated the nascent form of a view that is cur-
rently shared by many physicists: If there is a ﬁnal theory of nature,
one of the most convincing arguments in support of its particular form
would be that the theory couldn't be otherwise. The ultimate theory
should take the form that it does because it is the unique explana-
tory framework capable of describing the universe without running
up against any internal inconsistencies or logical absurdities. Such a
theory would declare that things are the way they are because they
have to be that way. Any and all variations, no matter how small,
lead to a theory that - like the phrase 'This sentence is a lie' - sows the
seeds of its own destruction. / Establishing such inevitability in the
structure of the universe would take us a long way toward coming to
grips with some of the deepest questions of the ages. These questions
emphasize the mystery surrounding who or what made the unnumer-
able choices apparently required to design our universe. Inevitability
answers these questions by erasing the options. Inevitability means
that, in actuality, there are no choices. Inevitability declares that the
universe could not have been diﬀerent. [...] the pursuit of such rigidity
in the laws of nature lies at the heart of the uniﬁcation program in
modern physics. (Greene 1999, pp. 283).
So, the metaphysical intuition behind the uniqueness argument consists primarily
in the idea that things are as they are, because they have to be the way they are.
There are logical constraints that make nature the way it is. There is no freedom
of choice. There is only one possibility. There is no contingency. Nature is the
result of an all-encompassing necessity. It could not be otherwise. The world is
unique.13
13 This metaphysical intuition also existed before string theory.
A goal of science, and indeed of much of human knowledge, is to account for
the world as we ﬁnd it. If it could be argued that the world were either a priori
necessary or the only one possible consistent with some general principle, then an
important advance would have been made in accounting for the structure of the
world. (Cushing (1985), p. 33).
The uniqueness intuition does not at least form the heart of the thoroughly holistic bootstrap
program which its inventor, Geoﬀrey Chew, introduced in the sixties, at least in a truncated
form, into hadron physics. Cf. Chew (1968); Chew (1970); Chew (1983); Gale (1974) and
Gale (1975). For the bootstrap program, the only requirement for our description of nature is
self-consistency. Its central assumption is that nature is determined completely and uniquely
by internal coherence:
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But then, so the intuition, there can be only one unique, adequate, consistent,
all-encompassing description of nature. The constraints leading to the uniqueness
of our world would be reﬂected by its theoretical description. And they would
ﬁnally guarantee the adequacy of this consistent, all-encompassing description.
But, if there can be only one coherent, all-encompassing, adequate description
of the world, one would need only very few requirements for our fundamental
physical theory: (i) logical and conceptual consistency and (ii) most advanced
universality. The ﬁrst completely uniﬁed, consistently formulated, universal the-
ory we ﬁnd, would be this adequate description of nature. And the provable
mathematical uniqueness of this theory would only reinforce the argument.14
In the broadest sense, bootstrap philosophy asserts that nature is as it is because
this is the only possible nature consistent with itself. (Chew 1968, p. 762).
14 The uniqueness idea also reinforces the hope that a fundamental nomological description
of nature will not need any free parameters.
For many decades there has been a consensus on how to solve the problems of the
undetermined parameters: unify the diﬀerent forces and particles by increasing
the symmetry of the theory and the number of parameters will decrease. The
expectation that uniﬁcation reduces the number of parameters in a theory is due
both to historical experience and to philosophical argument. The former is easy
to understand: [...] Newton [...] Maxwell [...]. The philosophical argument is
along the lines of the following: reductionism will lead to a fundamental theory,
a fundamental theory will answer all possible questions and so can't have free
parameters, and uniﬁcation operates in the service of greater reductionism. Or
perhaps: the theory that uniﬁes everything should be able to answer all questions.
So it had better be unique, otherwise there would be unanswerable questions,
having to do with choosing which uniﬁed theory corresponds to nature. (Smolin
2004, p. 8).
If a fundamental theory includes free, empirically adjustable parameters, the suspicion re-
mains that it is not really fundamental, that there should be an even more fundamental theory
explaining these free parameters. The only alternative is that these free parameters reﬂect
a fundamental contingency. Our fundamental theory would describe a spectrum of possibili-
ties, of possible worlds, and a speciﬁc description of our world would need the speciﬁcation of
these free parameters. Exactly this alternative is excluded by the metaphysical thesis of the
uniqueness of our world. So, at least a really fundamental description of a unique world would
be programmatically incompatible with free, adjustable parameters. Free parameters reﬂect
either contingency or that our theory is not the fundamental theory. So, the idea of a unique
fundamental description of nature excludes free parameters.
Also, in the same way, the distinction between theory and contingent boundary conditions
is not acceptable for a unique fundamental theory. All theoretically relevant elements, not
explained by a theory, show that either there is contingency, incompatible with the uniqueness
intuition, or that the theory is not fundamental.
What about the nomology described by a fundamental theory and its spectrum of solutions?
Finally, also this distinction is incompatible with the concept of a unique fundamental theory.
The necessity of a selection between solutions, if this selection is not determined by the theory
itself, leads to the same problems; there remains only the alternative between fundamental
contingency and non-fundamentality of the theory - analogous to the case of free parameters or
of contingent boundary conditions. So, a complete exclusion of contingency is probably a very
hard job for physics. Maybe it can only be achieved within metaphysics.
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If this hope is realized, then it suﬃces to ﬁnd that one uniﬁed theory.
The ﬁrst fully consistent uniﬁed theory to be found will be the only
one that can be found and it will thus have to be the true theory of
nature. It has even been said that, because of this, physics no longer
needs experimental input to progress. At the advent of string theory,
this kind of talk was very common. The transition from physics as
an experimental science to physics based on ﬁnding the single uni-
ﬁed theory was even called the passage from modern to postmodern
physics. (Smolin 2005, pp. 26).
The fundamental problem with the uniqueness idea is that it might be false. There
could be contingency in the world. The world has not necessarily to be unique.
Other worlds could be possible. Then, our consistent, all-encompassing theory
has not necessarily to be adequate for the description of our world. Consistency
and universality would not necessarily mean adequacy. There could be more than
one consistent, universal theory, some describing other possible worlds, and only
one, possibly, describing our world.
However, even given the case that our world would be unique, the relation between
nature and our description of it might be rather complicated. There would be no
guarantee that the logical constraints decisive for the uniqueness of the world are
adequately and completely reﬂected within the results of our scientiﬁc endeavour.
Even in the case of the uniqueness of the world, there could remain an ambiguity
for possible consistent and universal theories. This could be a consequence of the
procedures we apply in the development of scientiﬁc models and theories. Given
such an ambiguity with regard to consistent, universal theories, only empirical
tests could reinforce the adequacy claim.
Also, it might be possible that we will never be able to formulate a consistent
theory of utmost universality that provides an adequate description of nature.
There is no guarantee to achieve this goal within the scientiﬁc procedures and the
conceptual framework at our disposal. Our epistemic capacities might be insuf-
ﬁcient to attain an adequate, all-encompassing understanding of nature. Maybe
there remains always a residuum of unexplainability, inaccessible to our epistemic
means.15 Then, an all-encompassing theory of nature would be impossible.
So, independently of postulated or proved theoretical uniqueness, of logical and
conceptual consistency, and of coherence, we should not rely on metaphysical
uniqueness intuitions, unless we ﬁnd better arguments for these intuitions. Within
the empirical sciences, uniqueness- and coherence-based arguments can not sub-
stitute empirical control. The crucial problem with mathematical models which
claim to be physical theories or even adequate descriptions of nature, without
having established any connection to empirical data and without even the slight-
est prospect of empirical control, is that the interpretation of their theoretical
statements with regard to possible correlates in nature gets completely out of
control.
15 Cf. Hedrich (1998); Hedrich (2001) and Hedrich (2002b).
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But, as a result of recent developments in string theory, these warnings are no
longer necessary. During the last years a demythologization of the uniqueness
argument shook the string community. String theories seem to describe, instead
of one unique world, a plethora of possible worlds. And, at the moment, it is not
even clear, if our world is one of them.
4 Contingency
No one described the process of demythologization of the uniqueness idea in string
theory better than Leonard Susskind:
The world view shared by most physicists is that the laws of nature
are uniquely described by some special action principle that com-
pletely determines the vacuum, the spectrum of elementary particles,
the forces and the symmetries. Experience with quantum electrody-
namics and quantum chromodynamics suggests a world with a small
number of parameters and a unique ground state. For the most part,
string theorists bought into this paradigm. At ﬁrst it was hoped that
string theory would be unique and explain the various parameters
that quantum ﬁeld theory left unexplained. When this turned out
to be false, the belief developed that there were exactly ﬁve string
theories with names like type-2a and Heterotic. This also turned out
to be wrong. Instead, a continuum of theories were discovered that
smoothly interpolated between the ﬁve and also included a theory
called M-Theory. The language changed a little. One no longer spoke
of diﬀerent theories, but rather diﬀerent solutions of some master the-
ory. (Susskind 2003, p. 1).
Signiﬁcantly more ironic is Lee Smolin's comment:
[...] the number of string theories for which there is some evidence for
has been growing exponentially as string theorists developed better
techniques to construct them. (Smolin 2004, p. 10).
One of the fundamental problems with this multitude of string scenarios is to
set them in relation to observable phenomenology. So, it should, not at least, be
possible to identify the quantum ﬁeld theoretical standard model of elementary
particle physics, with its interactions and symmetries, as one of the low energy
limits resulting from the spectrum of possible string scenarios.16 But this seems
16 In this context, the free parameters of the standard model should be reproduced and
explained by a theoretical scenario which works, on the fundamental level, without these pa-
rameters. It is not at all clariﬁed, if this will be possible:
All currently accepted physical theories require some phenomenological input.
Our recent enthusiasm for string theory as the theory of everything has given rise
to the hope that the only necessary inputs are the basic dimensionful parameters
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to be rather problematic. There exists in string theory an immense number of
possibilities for the broken symmetries in the energy range of the standard model.
In Michio Kaku's words, there are
[...] millions of ways to break down the theory to low energies.
(Kaku 1999, p. 17).
The ambiguity with regard to the resulting low energy symmetries is, not at least,
a consequence of the ambiguity caused by the immense number of possibilities for
the transition from the original ten-dimensional dynamics of string theory, forced
by the requirement of internal consistency, to the phenomenologically relevant
implications for a four-dimensional spacetime.
Now, we would be more than glad if strings would remain in lower
dimensions as simple as they are in D = 10. However, especially string
theories in D = 4 turn out to be much more complicated. (Lerche
2000, p. 18).
In the geometrical picture of compactiﬁcation, this ambiguity of the transition
corresponds to the multitude of answers to the question in which form the six
surplus dimensions can be compactiﬁed. None of the possible compactiﬁcations
has a better theoretical justiﬁcation than any other.
There is no known reason why a ten dimensional theory wants at all
to compactify down to D = 4; many choices of space-time background
vacua of the form R10−n×Xn appear to be on equal footing. (Lerche
2000, p. 19).
For compactiﬁcation, there exists (i) a large number of possible Calabi-Yau spaces
with diﬀerent topologies. For every topology there exists additionally (ii) a contin-
uum of geometric parameters. And (iii), for every point on the four-dimensional
spacetime, resulting from the compactiﬁcation of the six surplus dimensions, these
parameters can be diﬀerent.
First, there are many topologies of Calabi-Yau manifolds, which re-
present discrete choices for the conﬁgurations of the extra six dimen-
sions. [...] But even worse, there are continuous families of Calabi-Yau
manifolds, where the shape and size of the manifold varies continu-
ously. Moreover, these parameters may vary as a function of four-
dimensional coordinate x. [...] This variation is parametrized by a
four-dimensional ﬁeld R(x) giving the characteristic size as a function
of position. (Giddings 2005, p. 10).
which deﬁne the conversion between socially deﬁned scales of measurement and
the fundamental units of mass, length, time and action. This is not necessarily
the case, and the existence of mathematically consistent, disconnected, models of
quantum gravity suggests that it is not the case. (Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003,
p. 21).
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So, there is an immense number of possible combinations of these partially con-
tinuous and partially discrete geometrical and topological parameters which char-
acterize the structure of the corresponding compact manifold and which can vary
for every point on the four-dimensional spacetime resulting from the compactiﬁ-
cation. These parameters are usually called moduli.17
Most important for the relation between the spectrum of string scenarios and phe-
nomenology is that diﬀerent parameter combinations, corresponding to diﬀerent
compactiﬁcation scenarios, lead in almost all cases to completely diﬀerent physical
results on the extended four-dimensional spacetime remaining after compactiﬁ-
cation. So, diﬀerent compactiﬁcation scenarios mean diﬀerent physics: diﬀerent
symmetries, diﬀerent particle spectra and masses, diﬀerent eﬀective low energy
parameters.
[...] there are many Calabi-Yau three-folds and each gives rise to
diﬀerent physics in M4 . Having no means to choose which one is
'right', we lose predictive power. (Greene 1997, p. 9).
And this physical and, consequently, phenomenological variability seems to be in-
dependent from the question, if the six compactiﬁed surplus dimensions of string
theory should be interpreted geometrically as real space-dimensions or rather as
a useful picture for an internal dynamical parameterization. It seems to be inde-
pendent of the question, if compactiﬁcation should be understood in a realistic
sense as spacetime phenomenon or rather as a structural metaphor for the pa-
rameterizable multitude of expression modes of the low energy phenomenology of
a still unknown fundamental theory of which string theory is an approximation.
Let's have a closer look at the problems resulting from the spectrum of string sce-
narios. Every point of the conﬁguration space of possible moduli combinations
of supersymmetric string theory, the so-called supermoduli-space, represents in
the context of the compactiﬁcation picture a speciﬁc six-dimensional Calabi-Yau
17
Examples of moduli are the size and shape parameters of the compact inter-
nal space that 4-dimensional string theory always needs. [...] In a low energy
approximation the moduli appear as massless scalar ﬁelds. (Susskind 2003, p. 1).
Appearing as massless scalar ﬁelds within the four-dimensional spacetime, the moduli lead to
long-range interactions, being in competition with gravity and thereby violating the equivalence
principle. The hope remains that they are an artifact of the perturbative approach of string
theory.
These massless ﬁelds are all called moduli ﬁelds, and they are a desaster. [...] pa-
rameters in the four-dimensional lagrangian, such as fermion masses and coupling
constants will all vary with the moduli. Worse still, the modulus ﬁelds interact
with the other ﬁelds of the theory with gravitational strength. Massless scalars
with such interactions lead to ﬁfth forces, time-dependent coupling constants,
and/or extra light matter, none of which are seen experimentally. (Giddings
2005, p. 10).
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space and corresponds to a resulting eﬀective low energy nomology for the ex-
tended four-dimensional spacetime: a string vacuum.18 To compare these string
vacua with the observable phenomenology, it would be necessary to derive the
low energy implications (e.g. the parameters for the eﬀective low energy quantum
ﬁeld theories) for all possible moduli combinations. But, this can not be achieved
within the framework of perturbative string theory.19 However, even if the cal-
culation of the low energy implications of a speciﬁc compactiﬁcation scheme (or
even of all compactiﬁcation schemes) were possible, the problem would remain
that there are a lot of diﬀerent string vacua amongst which we had to look for
the symmetries and the coupling parameters of the standard model, or for the
phenomenologically adequate scenario respectively. And we would probably have
to explain afterwards what distinguishes the identiﬁed vacuum from all the oth-
ers. We would have to explain, why exactly the identiﬁed vacuum is realized in
our world.
And it is a massive understatement to talk about a lot of string scenarios: re-
cent estimations suggest between 10100 and 10500 eﬀective four-dimensional string
vacua.20 For this spectrum recently the terms landscape21 and discretuum22
were introduced.23
The string landscape can be best understood as a multidimensional conﬁguration
space of the parameterization of possible eﬀective physical scenarios (worlds),
with diﬀerent symmetries, with diﬀerent interactions and interaction structures,
with diﬀerent coupling parameters, with diﬀerent particle spectra and particle
masses.
For practical purposes, the landscape gives us a large set of alterna-
tive eﬀective Lagrangians for describing the physics we have observed
in our universe. These are parametrized by a collection of numbers,
which include the dimensions of space-time, the name, rank and re-
presentation content of the low energy gauge theory, the value of the
18 For a ﬁrst comparison with phenomenology, it is probably suﬃcient to restrict considera-
tions to the string vacua, because they reﬂect the most relevant low energy implications.
[...] most of the physics that is observable at low energies seems to be governed
by the vacuum (zero mode) structure and not by the microscopic theory, at least
as far as we can see today. (Lerche 2000, p. 19).
19 And there does not exist any consistent non-perturbative formulation of string theory,
a problem connected probably to the fact, that the fundamental physical principle of string
theory is still unknown.
20 Until now, the investigation of string vacua and their statistics has been carried out ex-
clusively by means of approximations for weak coupling, and by subsequent combinatorial rea-
soning. The correctness of the results depends on the hope that the duality relations between
the perturbative formulations of string theory lead to a suﬃciently representative picture of the
spectrum of string vacua. Cf. Douglas (2003).
21 Cf. Susskind (2003).
22 Cf. Banks/Dine/Gorbatov (2003).
23 The question, if the string landscape includes sectors which do not result from the super-
moduli space of supersymmetric vacua, will be discussed below.
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cosmological constant, and the values of all the coupling constants
and masses of ﬁelds in the Lagrangian. These numbers can be col-
lected together and viewed as a multidimensional probability space.
(Banks 2004, p. 16).
The connective structure within the landscape, especially the possible combina-
tions of discrete and continuous parameters, is presently far from clariﬁed.
[...] the notion of connectedness in this landscape is, at best, obscure.
(Dine 2004b, p. 3).
In particular, Thomas Banks emphasizes again and again the
[...] disconnected moduli space [...]. (Banks 2004, p. 18).
Banks has fundamental doubts about the existence of the landscape, because
the landscape hypothesis is the result of calculations based on the apparatus of
eﬀective ﬁeld theory. According to Banks this is completely inadequate in the
context of string theory and leads to highly questionable results.24
[...] the landscape of string theory is far from an established fact.
[...] my personal bottom line on this subject is that the Landscape
probably does not exist. (Banks 2004, p. 2).
Banks points out to the fact that there exists no common action function in the
sense of quantum ﬁeld theory for the diﬀerent string scenarios of the landscape.
So, the idea of diﬀerent solutions to the same theory and, especially, of the pos-
sibility of transitions between these solutions by variation of certain parameters
is, according to Banks, not applicable to string theory.
Banks has argued cogently that one cannot use eﬀective ﬁeld theory
to study multiple vacua in theories of gravity. For example, in many
circumstances there are no transitions between the diﬀerent states,
and an observer in one can not do experiments which will indicate
the existence of others. So it is not clear that the multiplicity of
states has any meaning. (Dine 2004a, p. 7).
It is an illusion, as Banks suggests, that the diﬀerent string vacua of the land-
scape are resulting from the same theory. Diﬀerent moduli-combinations belong,
according to Banks, to completely diﬀerent Hamilton functions.
The notion of diﬀerent vacua of the same theory, in any of the senses
that this is meant in quantum ﬁeld theory, is simply not applica-
ble to theories of quantum gravity, beyond the very limited context
of continuous moduli spaces of Super-Poincaré invariant S-matrices.
(Banks 2004, pp. 3).
24 Cf. Banks (2004); Banks (2003); Banks/Dine/Gorbatov (2003).
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So, either we can get to the conclusion that the landscape of string theory does
not exist.
Still, the possibility that the landscape may not exist should be kept
in mind. (Dine 2004a, p. 73).
Or, to interpret Banks' arguments in another way, the landscape does not consist
of diﬀerent solutions of the same theory, but of an immense multitude of per
se autonomous theoretical scenarios and nomological structures which belong, in
a certain way, to the same family of theories. Then, transitions between these
scenarios do not exist. One can not get dynamically, by variation of parameters,
from one scenario to another.
The problem of the relation between the landscape of string theory and the
observable low energy phenomenology remains. And even if the landscape hy-
pothesis will be elaborated in a more conclusive way within string theory, it is
evidently impossible that a vacuum which resembles our world will be found
within the vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space. The crucial point of
this particular problem is supersymmetry. Superstring theories can, at least in
the traditional perturbative formulation, only be consistently formulated, if they
include supersymmetry. Without supersymmetry, mathematical anomalies and
non-renormalizable divergences are unavoidable. Consequently, all vacua result-
ing from the supermoduli-space of string theory are supersymmetric.25 But our
25But,
[...] the supersymmetry forbids any potential on the moduli space. (Banks/
Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 19).
This means that all vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space would be energetically degen-
erated. There wouldn't be any energy diﬀerences between the string vacua resulting from the
supermoduli-space which might help to identify and select a vacuum which could be assumed
as being realized physically in our world.
And, supersymmetry has a further decisive consequence: For all string vacua resulting from
the supermoduli-space the cosmological constant is necessarily zero.
The value of the potential energy at the minimum is the cosmological constant
for the vacuum. [...] The supermoduli-space is a special part of the landscape
where the vacua are supersymmetric and the potential [...] is exactly zero. [...]
On the supermoduli-space the cosmological constant is also exactly zero. Roughly
speaking, the supermoduli-space is a perfectly ﬂat plain at exactly zero altitude.
(Susskind 2003, p. 2).
This seems to be incompatible with recent astrophysical data and with their corresponding
cosmological implications.
A key problem has been constructing string theories that agree with the astro-
nomical evidence that the vacuum energy (or cosmological constant) is positive.
The problem is that a positive cosmological constant is not consistent with su-
persymmetry. But supersymmetry appears to be necessary to cancel dramatic
instabilities having to do with the existence of tachyons in the spectrum of string
theories. (Smolin (2004) 10).
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world is obviously not fully supersymmetric. Unbroken supersymmetry is incom-
patible with observable phenomenology. In a fully supersymmetric world, our
known matter and interaction particles and their corresponding supersymmet-
ric partners would have the same masses. If they would have the same masses,
we would already have found these supersymmetric partners. So, only a broken
supersymmetry can be realized in our world. Because all string vacua resulting
from the supermoduli-space are fully supersymmetric, obviously none of these
vacua can give a description of our world.
So far, no string theory background is known which is consistent with
all features of the observed universe. They all have one or more of
the following features, which each disagree with observation: no posi-
tive cosmological constant, unbroken supersymmetry, massless scalar
ﬁelds. (Smolin 2003, p. 48).
If the spectrum of string vacua were exclusively resulting from the supermoduli-
space, string theory must be wrong. Supersymmetric vacua can not reproduce
observable phenomenology. So, either string theory is wrong, or the supermoduli-
space can not be everything which contributes to the spectrum of string vacua.
[...] the continuum of solutions in the supermoduli-space are all su-
persymmetric with exact super-particle degeneracy and vanishing cos-
mological constant. Furthermore they all have massless scalar parti-
cles, the moduli themselves. Obviously none of these vacua can possi-
bly be our world. Therefore the string theorist must believe that there
are other discrete islands lying oﬀ the coast of the supermoduli-space.
[...] This view is not inconsistent with present knowledge [...] but I
ﬁnd it completely implausible. (Susskind 2003, p. 1).
How could a broken supersymmetry result from string theory without leading to
mathematical and physical anomalies? Ten-dimensional perturbative string theo-
ries are necessarily fully supersymmetric. The only possibility imagined until now
consists in the idea that supersymmetry breaking is a result of compactiﬁcation.
The mathematics of compactiﬁcation should therefore make understandable how
a broken supersymmetry and the fact that we don't observe supersymmetry mul-
tiplets in our world can result from a fully supersymmetric theory. There should
be compactiﬁcations which lead from a fully supersymmetric ten-dimensional
theory to a broken supersymmetry for the resulting four-dimensional vacuum.
Then, the string landscape would contain vacua which do not result from the
supermoduli-space. But this extension of the spectrum of string vacua is actually
no more than a speculative extrapolation.26
26 Banks has his doubts with regard to this extrapolation.
There are many disconnected continuous families of Poincaré invariant solution
to string theory. They have various dimensions, low energy ﬁelds, and topologies,
but they all share the property of exact [supersymmetry]. The program of string
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phenomenology is to ﬁnd a [supersymmetry] violating, Poincaré invariant solution
of the theory, which describes low energy scattering in the real world. In [Banks
(2001)] I expressed the opinion that no such solution exists. (Banks 2003, p. 2).
He points out that there are not even approximate solutions indicating the possibility of a
broken supersymmetry.
There are no known asymptotically ﬂat string vacua with broken [supersymme-
try]. (Banks 2003, p. 30).
As of this date, we know of no example of a controllable approximation to a theory
of quantum gravity that leads to a nonsupersymmetric theory in asymptotically
ﬂat, Poincaré invariant spacetime. [...] This failure [...] leads me to conjecture that
there are no [supersymmetry] violating, Poincaré invariant theories of quantum
gravity. (Banks 2003, pp. 7).
Nonetheless, some string theorists hope to be able to establish a deﬁnition for a non-zero
potential for these vacua with broken supersymmetry.
[...] the supermoduli-space is a perfectly ﬂat plain at exactly zero altitude. Once
we move oﬀ the plain, supersymmetry is broken and a non-zero potential develops
[...] Thus beyond the ﬂat plain we encounter hills and valleys. We are particularly
interested in the valleys where we ﬁnd local minima of V. (Susskind 2003, pp. 2).
But, as long as there are no reliable mathematical foundations for this picture, it is pure
speculation.
No perfectly precise deﬁnition exists in string theory for the moduli ﬁelds or their
potential when we go away from the supermoduli-space. (Susskind 2003, p. 17).
According to Banks, the idea of deﬁning an eﬀective potential for the landscape is not well-
founded, if not meaningless at all:
Much of the thinking implicit in discussions of ﬂux compactiﬁcations depends
on the notion that the eﬀective potential is an exact object, for which we are
presently able to ﬁnd only approximate expressions. This line of thought might
be completely wrong. We have no evidence from string theory or gravity that
such an object exists. (Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 8).
In my opinion, the concept of an eﬀective potential on moduli space as a tool
for ﬁnding string models of gravity, is a snare and a delusion, fostered by wishful
thinking, and without regard to the actual evidence in front of us. There is no
evidence for this concept in solid string theory calculations, and lots of evidence
against it. (Banks 2004, p. 4).
The notions of vacuum, eﬀective potential, and vacuum decay from ﬁeld theory,
are not correct ones in quantum gravity. (Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 24).
[...] it is clear that quantum gravity in asymptotically ﬂat spacetimes is a diﬀerent
kind of beast from quantum ﬁeld theory, with a high energy density of states unlike
any quantum theory we have dealt with before. [...] Much of the conventional
framework of quantum mechanics is lost. (Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 27).
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5 Selection
For a long time string theorists held to the idea that there can be only one
consistent, fundamental theory which describes our world, and that this theory
is string theory. Meanwhile, it turned out that the string approach very probably
leads to an immense multitude of theoretical scenarios describing possible worlds
with diﬀerent eﬀective low energy nomology.
For low energy observers, physics is diﬀerent in each of these states.
Gauge groups, coupling constants and the like all vary. The cosmo-
logical constant, in particular, is a random variable in these 101000 (?!)
states. (Dine 2004b, p. 6).
If at all, only one of these theoretical scenarios will describe our world with
its speciﬁc low energy phenomenology, its interactions, its gauge invariances, its
coupling parameters, its particle spectrum, its particle masses, and its spacetime
structure and dimensionality.
We believe that there are many mathematically consistent models
of quantum gravity, at most one of which describes the real world.
(Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 5).
But, which of the theoretical scenarios the string approach leads to, which of its
string vacua, corresponds to our world?
Despite the unity of the theory, string/M theory appears to describe
a very large number of four dimensional (and other) vacua with in-
equivalent physics, most of which clearly do not describe our universe.
At present we have no clue which one is relevant, or how to ﬁnd it.
(Douglas 2003, p. 1).
If there exist 10100 or 10500 diﬀerent string vacua, how can we identify the ad-
equate scenario? At the time, it is completely implausible that the low energy
implications for these diﬀerent string scenarios could be calculated.
It is clear that at a certain point in this process, if we don't falsify the
landscape easily, we will run into the problem that current technology
does not allow one to calculate the low energy parameters with any
degree of precision. Indeed, the error estimates are only guesses be-
cause we don't even know in principle how to calculate the next term
in the expansion in large ﬂuxes. (Banks 2004, p. 19).
But, even if it would be possible to derive the low energy phenomenology for
these scenarios, the immense number of string vacua would lead to a problem.
Clarity would only be achieved, if it could be shown that the string approach, on
principle, does not lead to any scenario compatible with observable low energy
phenomenology. Then string theory would simply not be able to describe our
world. This would falsify string theory.
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String theory could fail if there turn out to be no consistent and stable
string vacua consistent with all the observed features of our universe
including complete supersymmetry breaking, the absence of massless
scalar ﬁelds and a positive cosmological constant. / Conversely, string
theory could fail if it turns out that there are so many consistent and
stable string vacua consistent with all observations to date that they
populate the space of post-standard model physics densely enough
that the theory makes no predictions for future experiments. (Smolin
2003, p. 52).
If a falsiﬁcation via incompatibility with low energy phenomenology will not take
place, the problem remains. If there are 10100 or 10500 string vacua, and if there
are no constraints which exclude vacua resembling our world on principle, then,
even after a preselection which leaves only those vacua which resemble more or
less our world, there will probably still remain an immense multitude of possible
vacua, compatible with the observable phenomenology, but with diﬀerent nomol-
ogy. And, if this preselected ensemble of vacua corresponds to a continuum or a
dense discretuum of parameter values, it will be impossible to identify by empir-
ical means the vacuum representing our world, and therefore the nomology it is
based on, because the ﬁxing of the relevant parameters by measurement will only
lead to a ﬁnite exactitude.
However, if one takes the possibility of the existence of these theories
seriously, there is a disturbing consequence. For the number of distinct
theories that the evidence points to is vast, estimates have been made
on the order of 10100 to 10500. Each of these theories is consistent with
the macroscopic world being four dimensional, and the existence of a
positive and small vacuum energy. But they disagree about everything
else, in particular, they imply diﬀerent versions of elementary particle
physics, with diﬀerent gauge groups, spectra of fermions and scalars
and diﬀerent parameters. / That is, if the string theorists are right,
there are on the order of 10100 or more diﬀerent ways to consistently
unify gauge ﬁelds, fermions and gravity. This makes it likely that
string theory will never make any new, testable predictions concerning
the elementary particles. / Of course, a very small proportion of these
theories will be consistent with the data we have, to date, about
particle physics. Suppose this is only one in 1050. There will still be
1050 diﬀerent theories, which will diﬀer on what we will see in future
experiments at higher energy. This number is so vast, it appears likely
that whatever is found, there will be many versions of string theory
that agree with it. (Smolin 2004, p. 11).
We would never get from the observable phenomenology to the nomology from
which it results. There would simply be too much possible nomologies behind
the observable phenomenology and compatible with it.
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Accepting, at least provisionally, the existence of the landscape, the
nature and goals of string theory (fundamental physics) are diﬀerent
than we previously imagined. In this vast 'landscape', one can't hope
to ﬁnd 'the state' which describes our universe. Nor can our goal be
to predict all of the features of nature with arbitrary precision. (Dine
2004b, pp. 3).
Even if conclusive predictions could be achieved for all nomologies, empirical
methods would not be suﬃcient to decide which vacuum and which nomology
is ours. Even if the complete spectrum of its possible low energy implications
could be calculated, string theory would ﬁnally have no predictive power. Even
if all relevant implications for all string scenarios could be derived, string theory
would, on principle, be a theory which can not be falsiﬁed. String theory would
remain metaphysics, without any hope to become a physical theory.
But, even if string theory should remain a metaphysical theory, and even if it
should be impossible to identify the string vacuum which is realized in our world:
if string theory is the right metaphysical theory (how could we know?), which
means, not at least, that one of its vacua corresponds to our world, the question
remains: what makes this vacuum so special that it is realized? This is the so-
called vacuum selection problem of string theory. What inherent necessity, what
dynamical process, what structural constraints, what nomological implication, se-
lects the one string vacuum that is realized from the multitude of possibilities?
Or is it simply coincidence? Is our world simply a contingent selection from an
immense number of possibilities? - This ontological question remains, indepen-
dently of the epistemological question, if we can or can not identify this vacuum
within the spectrum of possibilities by means of empirical research.27
Even if a string theory background is found which is [...] consistent
with everything that is observed, does this tell us anything, given that
there is an inﬁnite space of possible string backgrounds to search? [...]
So, we should ask, even if there is a unique string theory background
consistent with what is observed, how could nature pick it out? One
might hope that there were a principle of stability or lowest energy
that would pick out a unique string theory background. However this
is unfortunately unlikely. (Smolin 2003, p. 48).
The only solution to the vacuum selection problem would consist in a plausible,
conclusive selection principle. But, even Michael Douglas, a specialist in the
statistics of string vacua, sees no chance to ﬁnd such a selection principle.
[...] there is a widespread feeling that a 'theory of everything' should
make unique predictions for the physics we observe. String/M theory
as we understand it now does not do this, and it is this lack which is
27 Coupled to the vacuum selection problem are a great number of open questions and prob-
lems: the determination of gauge invariances, of coupling parameters, of particle spectra, fam-
ilies and masses, of a broken supersymmetry, etc.
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often cited as the reason why a 'Vacuum Selection Principle' should
exist. Of course, this argument in itself is simply wishful thinking.
(Douglas 2003, pp. 5).
Not the least idea seems to exist, why a speciﬁc scenario out of the spectrum of
possibilities is realized with our world.
The recent progress in non-perturbative string theory does not solve
the problem of the choice of vacuum state either. The progress is
rather conceptual [...]. (Lerche 2000, p. 20).
The fundamental question behind the vacuum selection problem of string theory
is, if it will ever be possible to deduce all features of the world from a fundamental
description of nature, or if this strategy, aicted with contingency as the world
might be, won't be successful. Does the road to a uniﬁed and all-encompassing
description of nature lead to an elimination of contingency or will our universe
turn out to be only one contingently selected possibility out of a vast spectrum
of consistently possible scenarios?
Nomological extrapolation is carried as far as possible in string theory. But, mean-
while, with the landscape hypothesis and in absence of any reasonable selection
principle, is seems very improbable that a complete elimination of contingency
can be achieved in the context of string theory. String theory does not support the
idea that our world and its speciﬁc features are necessary. Moreover, the unique-
ness hypothesis to which string theorists held for a long time, and, with it, the
background assumption of a contingency-free, in its features completely necessary
world, the only consistent world at all, got a highly problematic status with the
recent developments in string theory, not to say that it was completely brought
down with the landscape hypothesis. If string theory gives an adequate descrip-
tion of nature (a probably unprovable assumption, if the following is correct), and
if the landscape hypothesis should turn out to be string theory's inevitable conse-
quence, that would mean that there is obviously not only one consistent structure
describing the one and only consistent world, but a lot of such structures, and
therefore a lot of possible worlds. Our world would simply be contingent with
regard to its speciﬁc features and its structure. Many structures, or many worlds
respectively, with diﬀerent physics, would be possible. Ours would be only one
of these possible worlds.
In this case, it might be that a uniﬁed, fundamental theory would not especially
refer to our world, but rather to the whole spectrum of possibilities. Our universe
(to use the language of the dominant model-theoretical apparatus of physics, i.e.
systems of diﬀerential equations) would perhaps be represented by one of the
many solutions of the fundamental equations of a ﬁnal, uniﬁed theory. The fun-
damental equations of the theory would represent the whole ensemble of possible
worlds. Under these conditions, a uniﬁed theory would not determine the fea-
tures and the nomological structure of our world without the speciﬁcation of some
free parameters. These parameters would be a constitutive part of the solution
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representing our world. With regard to the fundamental equations of the uniﬁed
theory, they would have to be considered as boundary conditions.
Without any selection principle, it is not very far from the contingency hypothesis
to the ensemble hypothesis.28 The corresponding transition consists simply in the
idea, that physically possible scenarios are not only possible, but (whatever that
means) physically real, like our world, forming an ensemble of real worlds: a mul-
tiverse. 29 But, naturally, to talk about an ensemble of causally unconnected, real
worlds means to take for granted (at least for the argument's sake) a very stable
realism including the willingness to attribute real ontic status to entities which
are empirically inaccessible by deﬁnition. So, there is no doubt that the ensemble
hypothesis is a metaphysical concept, unprovable empirically on principle. And
therefore, there will only be a reasonable motivation for the ensemble hypothesis,
if there exists (beside the highly speculative theoretical ideas of string theory)
a context of relevance based, at least partially, in empirical evidence (and, fur-
thermore, completely independent of string theory and its landscape hypothesis).
But, before turning to such a context (the spectrum of possible explanations for
the ﬁne-tuning of the universe) it is useful to have a closer look at the ensemble
hypothesis and its implications.
Crucial for the transition from the contingency hypothesis to the ensemble hy-
pothesis are the answers to the following questions: What does it mean exactly
that a world is not only possible, but also real? Or, that it is possible, but not
real? Why is our world not only possible, but also actually existing? Do other
possible worlds also actually exist? What does it mean to exist?
28 An independent motivation for the ensemble hypothesis consists in the ﬁne-tuning of the
universe. See below.
29 It is useful, as a ﬁrst concretization of the ensemble idea, to understand the worlds within
such an ensemble as causally unconnected realizations of possibilities. This implies that it would
be completely meaningless to think about the worlds within the ensemble as existing parallely
in a temporal sense. They would only share a common conﬁguration space of structural and
nomological possibilities.
Lee Smolin gives an explicit formulation of the ensemble hypothesis with regard to quantum
gravity:
A There exists (in the same sense that our chairs, tables and our universe exists)
a very large ensemble of 'universes', M which are completely or almost completely
causally disjoint regions of spacetime, within which the parameters of the standard
models of physics and cosmology diﬀer. To the extent that they are causally
disjoint, we have no ability to make observations in other universe than our own.
The parameters of the standard models of particle physics and cosmology vary
over the ensemble of universes. (Smolin 2004, p. 4)
C There are many diﬀerent possible consistent phenomenological descriptions
of physics, relevant for the possible description of elementary particle physics at
scales less than Planck energies. These may correspond to diﬀerent phases of the
vacuum, or diﬀerent theories altogether. (Smolin 2004, p. 12)
Multiverse hypothesis. Assuming A and C, the whole of reality - which we
call the multiverse - consists of many diﬀerent regions of spacetime, within which
phenomena are governed by diﬀerent of these phenomenological descriptions. For
simplicity, we call these universes. (Smolin 2004, p. 12).
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6 Everything
The most extreme answer to these questions can be found in Max Tegmark's
Ultimate Ensemble Theory:30
Physical existence is equivalent to mathematical existence. [...] Mathe-
matical existence is merely freedom from contradiction. (Tegmark
1998, p. 7).
The Ultimate Ensemble Theory is in Tegmark's own assessment
[...] a form of radical Platonism, asserting that the mathematical
structures in Plato's realm of ideas, the Mindscape of Rucker, exist
'out there' in a physical sense, akin to what Barrow refers to as 'pi in
the sky'. (Tegmark 1998, p. 4).
But, as Tegmark suggests, the spectrum of consistent possibilities is probably not
as immense as one might think:
Although a rich variety of structures enjoys mathematical existence,
the variety is limited by the requirement of self-consistency and by
the identiﬁcation of isomorphic ones. (Tegmark 1998, p. 8).
Crucial for Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble Theory is the question what he means
exactly when speaking about the physical existence of consistent mathematical
structures. For him the physical existence of a structure means: to appear as
physically existing for a self-aware substructure the structure contains. Then,
one actually does not need any more the consistency requirement, because incon-
sistent structures certainly do not contain self-aware substructures.
Our deﬁnition of a mathematical structure having [physical exis-
tence] was that if it contained a [self-aware substructure], then this
[self-aware substructure] would subjectively perceive itself as exist-
ing. This means that Hilbert's deﬁnition of mathematical existence
as self-consistency does not matter for our purposes, since inconsistent
systems are too trivial to contain [self-aware substructures] anyway.
(Tegmark 1998, p. 9).
30 Cf. Tegmark (1998). Tegmark's theory can be seen as the ideal contrasting background to
the vacuum selection problem of string theory, at least as long as string theory is supposed not
to cover all mathematically consistent possibilities, but only a speciﬁc part of these, preselected
by speciﬁc nomological constraints. It would be most interesting, if it could be shown that
string theory already includes all mathematically consistent possibilities, as Wolfgang Lerche
suggests:
In view of the many non-trivial consistency constraints that are fulﬁlled, it is
most likely that there is simply no room for a 'diﬀerent' consistent theory; in
other words, it is likely that what we have found is the complete space of all
possible consistent quantum theories that include gravity, and string theory may
perhaps be viewed as one way of eﬃciently parametrizing it (in certain regions of
its parameter space). (Lerche 2000, p. 33).
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But, not even every consistent structure will contain self-aware substructures
which could perceive the structure they inhabit as existing. And, if a mathe-
matical structure does not contain self-aware substructures, it is, according to
Tegmark, completely pointless to ask for the physical existence of the structure.
For the many other mathematical structures that correspond to dead
worlds with no [self-aware substructures] there to behold them [...],
who cares whether they have [physical existence] or not? [...] The
answer to Hawking's question, 'What is it that breathes ﬁre into the
equations and makes a Universe for them to describe?' would then be
'you, the [self-aware substructure]'. (Tegmark 1998, p. 46).
So, the question of physical existence can be reduced to the question of the
existence of self-aware substructures.
We could eliminate the whole notion of [physical existence] from our
[theory of everything] by simply rephrasing it as if a mathematical
structure contains a [self-aware substructure], it will perceive itself as
existing in a physically real world. (Tegmark 1998, p. 46).
There are two contrary strategies one can use in order to get scientiﬁcally rele-
vant results from Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble Theory: (i) a top-down approach,
starting from the global perspective of the entire spectrum of consistent struc-
tures, and (ii) a bottom-up approach, starting from the particular and contingent
perspective of a self-aware substructure which does not know which structure it
inhabits.31
The picture is that some of these mathematical structures contain
'self-aware substructures' [...]. To calculate the physical predictions
of the theory, we therefore need to address the following questions:
1. Which structures contain [self-aware substructures]?
2. How do these [self-aware substructures] perceive the structures
that they are part of?
3. Given what we perceive, which mathematical structures are most
likely to be the ones that we inhabit? (Tegmark 1998, p. 39).
In the top-down approach, the objective is to ﬁnd out which structures exist
physically, i.e. which of the consistent structures contain self-aware substructures.
[...] we are asking how large the 'cognizable' part of the grand en-
semble is. (Tegmark 1998, p. 39).
31 In string theory, the global perspective corresponds to the investigation of the spectrum
of vacua within the landscape, and of the statistics of this spectrum; the particular perspective
corresponds to the problem to identify, starting from the observable phenomenology, the string
vacuum realized in our world.
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For that, one has to investigate the entire parameter space of structural possibil-
ities with regard to the question, which constellations lead to the necessary and
adequate preconditions for self-aware substructures.32
[...] explore the parameter space [...] map out the archipelago of
potential habitable islands [...]. (Tegmark 1998, p. 48).
The bottom-up strategy corresponds to our usual scientiﬁc procedures. Our sit-
uation in the world can be characterized, above all, by the fact that it is not
at all obvious which structure we inhabit.33 So, how can this structure be iden-
tiﬁed from the particular perspective of a self-aware substructure, the observer,
the experimentator? This problem is the starting point of all empirical research
and, therefore, of the development of scientiﬁc theories. It is exactly what makes
empirical science necessary. It is the struggle to get from the phenomenology to
the nomology, i.e. to the mathematical structure behind appearance. In the case
of the structure we inhabit, this investigation is going on at least since Galileo
Galilei.34
32 Although this is certainly no simple task, Tegmark has already some ideas about the
possible results of such an investigation.
However, since the number of constraints for our own particular existence is much
greater than the number of free parameters, we argued that it is likely that there
is an archipelago of many such small islands, corresponding to diﬀerent nuclear
reaction chains in stellar burning and diﬀerent chemical compositions of the [self-
aware substructures]. The presence of a smaller number of much more severe
constraints indicates that this archipelago also has an end, so that large regions
on parameter space are likely to be completely devoid of [self-aware substructures],
and it is likely that the total number of islands is ﬁnite. (Tegmark 1998, p. 40).
[...] islands of habitability are small and rare [...] it might even be possible to
catalogue all of them. (Tegmark 1998, p. 40).
33 The connecting link between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches consists in the
question, how a structure, existing in the Tegmarkian sense, would appear to the self-aware
substructures it contains. How would a structure appear from an inner perspective? What
phenomenology would a speciﬁc structure evoke?
34 But, according to Tegmark's opinion, there could be limits for our scientiﬁc approach.
There could be unavoidable ambiguities with regard to the possible structures behind appear-
ance. Diﬀerent structures might be compatible with our phenomenology. The only viable
strategy would then consist in taking the simplest of these structures as the eﬀective nomology
leading to observable phenomenology.
Since some aspects of complex mathematical structures can often be approxi-
mated by simpler ones, we might never be able to determine precisely which one
we are part of. However, if this should turn out to be the case, it clearly will not
matter, since we can then obtain all possible physical predictions by just assuming
that our structure is the simplest of the candidates. (Tegmark 1998, p. 42).
However, the most serious problem is not ambiguity. It is not the case in which we ﬁnd too
many nomological structures compatible with the observable phenomenology; it is rather the
case in which we don't ﬁnd even one empirically adequate nomological structure.
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A very interesting feature of the Ultimate Ensemble Theory is that it fulﬁlls
the requirements for a fundamental theory in the most radical way: it does not
contain any free parameters.
Our [theory of everything] takes this ensemble enlargement to its
extreme, and postulates that all structures that exist in the mathe-
matical sense [...] exist in the physical sense as well. The elegance
of this theory lies in its extreme simplicity, since it contains neither
any free parameters nor any arbitrary assumptions about which of all
mathematical equations are assumed to be 'the real ones'. (Tegmark
1998, p. 38).
And it does not contain any information at all.35
[...] an entire ensemble is often much simpler than one of its mem-
bers, which can be stated more formally using the notion of algorithmic
information theory [...]. In this sense, our 'ultimate ensemble' of all
mathematical structures has virtually no algorithmic complexity at
all. (Tegmark 1998, p. 44)
On its global level, in the top-down view, the Ultimate Ensemble Theory does
away with every contingency. Every alternative theory will contain a certain
amount of contingency, if it does not turn out to be identical, ﬁnally, to the
Ultimate Ensemble Theory. Contingency is in the Ultimate Ensemble Theory
restricted to the bottom-up view. But here, it is inevitable. The phenomenology
a self-aware substructure can observe within the structure it inhabits is necessarily
contingent. Even a maximal bottom-up perspective is restricted by the structure
to which it belongs. From the particular perspective, no way leads to a global
perspective. The particular perspective is always limited to its structure. So,
from the bottom-up perspective, the inexistence of contingency on the global
level must always remain a metaphysical hypothesis.
This resembles much the situation in string theory facing the implications of
the landscape hypothesis and the vacuum selection problem. Already in the
Ultimate Ensemble Theory a mode of argumentation can be seen at work, at
least implicitly, which is prevalent within the recent development of string theory
and the discussion about the string landscape: It is the idea of anthropic selection
and of the so-called weak anthropic principle.36
The fact of the matter is that we to date have found no self-consistent mathe-
matical structure that can demonstrably describe both quantum and general rel-
ativistic phenomena. (Tegmark 1998, p. 48).
35 Cf. Tegmark (1996).
36 Cf. Barrow/Tipler (1986); Hartle (2004) and Smolin (2004).
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7 Anthropica
The weak anthropic principle itself is nothing but a tautology. It simply reminds
us that the world we inhabit must necessarily fulﬁll conditions that make our
existence possible. We can not live in a world which is incompatible with our
existence.
This rather tautological (but often overlooked) statement that we
have no right to be surprised about things necessary for our existence
has been termed the weak anthropic principle. (Tegmark 1998, p. 6).
The weak anthropic principle becomes only an interesting tautology in combina-
tion with the idea that some or perhaps even most of the possible worlds, more
or less diﬀerent from ours, would probably lead to conditions which make the
existence of complex organisms with epistemic capacities impossible. We would
never ﬁnd ourselves in such worlds, simply because we could not live in these
worlds. Even if there would be a multitude of worlds, it is evident that we neces-
sarily inhabit a world that has a make-up which allows our existence. This would
not be an accidental coincidence, but one of the preconditions of our existence.
Not only the principal ontological and nomological possibilities would be decisive
for the spectrum of worlds in which we might ﬁnd ourselves, but, to a far greater
amount, the conditions which are indispensable for our existence.
So, an anthropic reasoning with regard to the conditions realized in our world
will only have relevance, if there are good arguments supporting the assump-
tion of the existence of an ensemble of worlds, some of which make epistemic
subjects possible, and others not. Where could such arguments for an ensemble
hypothesis come from? One single speculative theory supporting the ensemble
hypothesis (like string theory) does certainly not provide a suﬃcient motivation
for scenarios in which anthropic arguments ﬁnd their application. There should
be additional and independent motivations for the ensemble hypothesis.37 The
best of these independent motivations for the ensemble hypothesis consists in
the so-called ﬁne-tuning of the universe: There are well-founded indications
(based on well-established theories supported by empirical data) that minimal
variations of the natural constants (coupling parameters, particle masses, cos-
mological constant etc.) which characterize our world would lead to universes
with physical conditions which would make the existence of complex organisms
with epistemic capacities very improbable, if not impossible.38 If life, especially
complex organisms with cognitive and epistemic capacities, requires more or less
stable and rather complex chemical and cosmic structures, it can be shown to be
37 Such independent motivations could even lead to an additional reinforcement of the en-
semble hypothesis in the context of string theory.
38 Rees (1999) and Barrow/Tipler (1986). A minimal variation of the cosmological constant
realized in our universe, e.g., would make the formation of large-scale cosmological structures
impossible: no galaxies, no formation of second-generation stars and planetary systems contain-
ing higher chemical elements, no life. A minimal variation of the parameters of the standard
model of elementary particle physics (particle masses, coupling constants etc.) would make
atomic structures impossible: no atomic structures, no chemical structures, no life.
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compatible only with a very small range of parameters: only with minimal vari-
ations of the natural constants characterizing our universe. Our universe seems
to be made-to-measure for our existence.
There are only three options to deal with the ﬁne-tuning of the universe: It
could be an unexplainable cosmic coincidence. With this option every scientiﬁc
ambition to explain the ﬁne-tuning ends. If we do not accept the ﬁne-tuning of
the universe as the result of pure coincidence, the question remains: How did we
get our made-to-measure universe? - It could be a designer-universe, especially
and deliberately made for us (or made for other reasons leading to conditions
compatible with our existence). This assumption is, if supposing good intentions,
the traditional subject of theological considerations and religious belief. If there
is no clarity with regard to the intentions, it can also ﬁnd its place in the context
of gnostic scenarios39 or the recently much discussed simulation argument40 as
well as the labyrinthic conceptions of science ﬁction.41
If there remains anything at all for scientiﬁc endeavors, it is the third alternative.
That our universe is made-to-measure for our existence would be no miracle, if
there exists a suﬃciently large ensemble of physically real42 universes. We would
ﬁnd ourselves necessarily in a universe compatible with our existence. The ﬁne-
tuning of the universe would be an anthropic selection eﬀect.43 The ensemble
hypothesis given, the ﬁne-tuning of the universe is no surprise.
39 Cf. Sloterdijk/Macho (1991).
40 Cf. Bostrom (2003); Hanson (2001); Schmidhuber (1997) and Tipler (1994).
41 Cf. Galouye (1964). Galouye's novel was adapted by R.W. Fassbinder in his ﬁlm Welt am
Draht (1973), remade by J. Rusnak as The Thirteenth Floor (1998). The Matrix (1999) of the
Wachowski Brothers - a gnostic metaphor par excellence - might be at least inspired by these
precursors. Cf. Chalmers (2003).
42 If one does not already use Tegmark's terminology, the worlds within this ensemble have
to exist. It is not suﬃcient that these worlds are only possible. See below.
43 But, one should not think that an anthropical selection would lead to unambiguity with
regard to the speciﬁc features of the universe in which we ﬁnd ourselves. It is rather unclear
what characteristics exactly are subject to an anthropic selection and how much variation of
the relevant parameters is compatible with the existence of intelligent life. Probably, the low
energy gauge symmetries, the parameters of the low energy Lagrangian, the matter content
(quantity and variety) of the universe, and especially the dimensionality of spacetime will be
anthropically decisive and will only admit small variations. The same holds probably for the
complexity of material systems which the fundamental nomology admits:
Fully linear equations (where all ﬁelds are uncoupled) presumably lack the com-
plexity necessary for [self-aware substructures], whereas nonlinearity is notorious
for introducing instability and unpredictability (chaos). In other words, it is not
implausible that there exists only a small number of possible systems of [partial
diﬀerential equations] that balance between violating the complexity constraint
on one hand and violating the predictability and stability constraints on the other
hand. (Tegmark 1998, p. 38).
Meanwhile, a sophisticated methodology for the application of anthropic arguments in the
natural sciences is under development. Its main objective is to calculate probabilities for the
diﬀerent relevant selectivities. Cf. Aguirre (2005); Stoeger/Ellis/Kirchner (2004) and Weinstein
(2005).
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However, it is very doubtful, admittedly, that the ensemble hypothesis with its
strong realism with regard to, on principle and by deﬁnition, inaccessible uni-
verses can really be considered a scientiﬁc concept. And therefore, it is also
very doubtful that the explanation of the ﬁne-tuning of the universe by means
of the ensemble hypothesis is a scientiﬁc explanation in the strict sense. But the
alternatives would be either the assumption of pure cosmic coincidence or the
designer-universe scenario. And with these alternatives the scientiﬁc endeavor
to understand nature ends deﬁnitively. So, if anything at all, only the ensemble
hypothesis remains.
And with the ensemble hypothesis as an argumentative scenario which, at least,
makes the ﬁne-tuning of the universe no miracle, theoretical models and physical
theories supporting ensemble scenarios are back in the game. In this context,
string theory reenters and possibly even gains additional plausibility.44 With re-
gard to (i) the ﬁne-tuning of the universe, (ii) the immense multitude of consistent
theoretical scenarios resulting from string theory, and (iii) the non-existence of
a vacuum selection principle which could be motivated by the theoretical frame-
work, it seems not completely implausible to understand the selection of a string
vacuum, representing our world, as an anthropic selection eﬀect.
With nothing preferring one vacuum over another, the anthropic prin-
ciple comes to the fore whether or not we like the idea. (Susskind
2003, p. 17).
However, this would mean that the string scenarios of the landscape are not only
nomological possibilities, but that they are physically realized. Only if they are
physically realized, an anthropic selection can take place. Contingency alone is
not suﬃcient for anthropic selection. Anthropic selection works only within an
ensemble of real worlds. So, a realism with regard to empirically inaccessible
worlds seems to be unavoidable. It would only be avoidable, if there were some
form of a causal or dynamical connection between the diﬀerent members of the
ensemble.
Recently, Leonard Susskind tried to formulate a concretization of this idea of a
dynamical connection by implementing the process of anthropic selection into a
cosmological scenario in which the diﬀerent string vacua are realized by a sequence
of dynamical transitions.
To make use of the enormous diversity of environments that string
theory is likely to bring with it, we need a dynamical cosmology which,
with high probability, will populate one or more regions of space with
an anthropically favorable vacuum. (Susskind 2003, p. 11).
The idea is that one only needs a suﬃciently large number of string vacua with
diﬀerent eﬀective nomology, realized subsequently during cosmic evolution. As a
44 Other theoretical frameworks, leading to the hypothesis of an ensemble of real worlds, are
the scenario of eternal inﬂation in cosmology and, with certain restrictions, Everett's relative
state formulation of quantum mechanics.
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dynamical transition mechanism between the subsequently realized string vacua,
vacuum tunneling seems to be the best candidate.45
[...] vacuum tunneling between solutions with diﬀerent values of the
cosmological constant [...] is often assumed to be the mechanism
which dynamically implements the anthropic principle. The universe
jumps around between vacua until it ﬁnds itself in an anthropically
allowed one, at which time we observe it. (Banks/Dine/Gorbatov
2003, p. 13).
But, should string theory describe nature, and should the ten dimensions of string
theory turn out to be a realistic description of spacetime, should furthermore the
landscape hypothesis be correct, and should dynamical transitions exist between
the scenarios of the landscape, this could lead to rather stormy prospects for our
universe.
If an observer starts with a large value of the cosmological con-
stant there will be many ways for the causal patch to descend to
the supermoduli-space. (Susskind 2003, p. 12)
The potential on the supermoduli-space is zero and so it is always pos-
sible to lower the energy by tunneling to a point on the supermoduli-
space. (Susskind 2003, p. 9)
The instability also allows the universe to sample all or a large part of
the landscape by means of bubble formation. (Susskind 2003, p. 17)
[...] it always ends in an inﬁnite expanding supersymmetric open
Fr[i]edman universe. (Susskind 2003, p. 15)
The ﬁnal and initial states do not have to be four dimensional.
(Susskind 2003, p. 20).
In short [...] if 1) there are extra dimensions of space and 2) the
Universe is undergoing accelerated expansion, then the present four-
dimensional state of the Universe is not a stable state. The Universe
is catastrophically unstable either to decompactiﬁcation of extra di-
mensions, to gravitational collapse to a big crunch, or in special cases,
possibly to decay to a four-dimensional supersymmetric universe.
(Giddings 2003, p. 3).
However, for all those who cling to life and need more certainty, there are Banks'
already mentioned arguments46 that, even if a multitude of string scenarios exists,
45 According to Susskind, these tunneling processes are unavoidable.
The vacua in string theory with lambda > 0 are not stable and decay on a time
scale smaller than the recurrence time. (Susskind 2003, p. 17).
46 Cf. Banks (2002); Banks (2003) and Banks (2004). See above. According to Banks, the
postulated scenarios forming the landscape are not to be seen as solutions to the same theory,
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that would not mean that there are dynamical transitions between these scenarios.
For the idea of an anthropic selection in string theory this would make impossible
any escape route from the strong realism with regard to empirically inaccessible
worlds.
8 Consequences
Whatever might happen to string theory and to its landscape hypothesis: in-
troducing anthropic reasoning into physics leads to a severe modiﬁcation of our
conception of science and its relation to reality. Not only that the traditional
requirements for our most fundamental theories are changing:
[...] in an anthropic theory simplicity and elegance are not consid-
erations. The only criteria for choosing a vacuum is utility, i.e. does
it have the necessary elements such as galaxy formation and complex
chemistry that are needed for life. (Susskind 2003, pp. 5).
Anthropic reasoning touches one of the traditionally central goals of physics. As
Steven Weinberg wrote long ago:
After all, we do not want merely to describe the world as we ﬁnd it,
but to explain to the greatest possible extent why it has to be the way
it is. Weinberg 1977, p. 34).
If an ensemble scenario, without an intrinsic, intratheoretically motivated selec-
tion principle, leading to the idea of anthropic selection, should turn out to be
unavoidable, this would probably be the end of a purely physical answer to Wein-
berg's question, why the world is as it is. We would possibly be able to ﬁnd out
to a certain degree how the world is. But the way it is would not be exclusively
subject to a physical, but to a cosmological or to an evolutionary explanation,
reﬂecting its contingency. - But this might depict things exactly as they are. If
we are not too fond of the metaphysical ideals of unambiguity and uniqueness,
but, if at all, as completely independent theoretical scenarios. But, if the string scenarios within
the landscape are not solutions of a common theoretical framework, the idea that there could
be dynamical transitions between them is wrong.
Unless one rejects the AdS/CFT prescription for quantum gravity in Anti de
Sitter space, it is diﬃcult to defend the idea that there is a unique theory of
quantum gravity, with diﬀerent realizations of it corresponding to minima of an
eﬀective potential. This ﬁeld theory inspired picture is based on a separation
between UV and IR physics which is simply not there in theories of quantum
gravity. I have tried to investigate both real and virtual transitions between
vacua with diﬀerent values of the cosmological constant, or isolated vacua with
the same values of the cosmological constant and found that they do not occur -
black holes get in the way. (Banks 2003, p. 76).
And without the possibility of dynamical transitions between the string vacua there would
be no dynamical vacuum selection.
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and if we are, at the same time, prepared to embrace a rather unlimited meta-
physical realism with regard to possible worlds, we might live very well with the
contingency of the world.
However, even if the landscape hypothesis of string theory should not turn out
to be an artifact, resulting from an abstruse theoretical dead end, completely
detached from any empirical control: does the inclusion of anthropic selection
really help us to decide, if string theory is an adequate fundamental description
of nature? - Even if we would know much more about anthropically suitable
conditions,47 anthropic reasoning would never lead to unambiguous results; it
leads to an only very limited predictability. If the landscape hypothesis should
turn out to be a necessary implication of string theory, we would only achieve
unambiguous results, if it could be shown that none of the scenarios of the string
landscape are anthropically suitable, possibly because all scenarios would neces-
sarily have unbroken supersymmetry. This would falsify string theory. It would
be our existence that falsiﬁes string theory.
But, if the landscape hypothesis turns out to be a necessary implication of string
theory, this is very probably the only way in which a falsiﬁcation of string theory
will be achievable. Otherwise it can not be falsiﬁed, because, as Lee Smolin
points out, the idea that the selection of a vacuum from the string landscape
should be understood as an anthropic eﬀect leads very easily to the following
self-immunization:
 'Our theory has many solutions Si . One of them, S1 gives rise to a
prediction X. If X is found that will conﬁrm the combination of our
theory and the particular solution S1 . But if X is not found belief in
the theory is not diminished, for there are a large number of solutions
that don't predict X. ' (Smolin 2004, p. 5).
Has string theory, with the landscape hypothesis and with its understanding
of the selection as an anthropic eﬀect, already reached the stage of this self-
immunization?
47 As long as it is not possible to derive the concrete low energy implications from the theory, it
is simply undecidable, anyway, if a certain scenario is anthropically suitable. But, even if the low
energy physics could be derived for all relevant scenarios, it would probably remain undecidable
to a certain degree which scenarios permit complex organisms with epistemic potential, because
the conditions for intelligent life are to a large degree unknown.
[...] I do not know how to implement the anthropic principle. It is nearly impossi-
ble to say: the weak anthropic principle (the requirement that we ﬁnd ourselves in
an environment or neighborhood which can support life) requires the cosmological
constant to be..., the ﬁne structure constant to be..., the strength of inﬂationary
ﬂuctuation to be... The problem is simply too complicated. (Dine 2004b, p. 8).
It is likely that the low energy dynamics of any theory satisfying our criteria would
be suﬃciently complicated that we would have little chance of deciding whether
complex, intelligent organisms could evolve in these alternative universes. (Banks
2003, p. 55).
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It is indeed plausible that this is already the case with string theory
[...]. (Smolin 2004, p. 5).
If anthropic selectivity dominates completely the relation between a theory and
the observable phenomenology, one obviously does not have to know much about
the fundamental theory, except that it includes, anyhow, with a probability above
zero, anthropically suitable solutions.
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the anthropic argument is that
it does not require us to know much about the Meta-theory, which
determines the probability distribution of the cosmological constant.
One requires only that such a theory exists and that the probability
distribution in the vicinity of the anthropic bound is nonzero, and
reasonably smooth. The lack of dependence on details of the Meta-
theory is important, because it is unlikely that any of those details
could be checked by experiment. If we needed to understand an elab-
orate mathematical theory, most of whose structure could never be
tested, in order to believe in the anthropic bound, then that bound
would appear much less plausible. (Banks 2003, pp. 46).
Given a theory with anthropically suitable solutions, a theory which could de-
scribe the fundamental nomology of our world, the suspicion always remains,
as long as there are no independent empirical tests, that there could be other
theories with the same virtues, but postulating completely diﬀerent fundamental
nomologies.
I must admit to a great deal of unease in talking about these argu-
ments. Consider the following model of a Meta-theory: A supreme
being plays dice with himself, and on the basis of each throw, decides
to construct a universe with a ﬁnite number of quantum states obey-
ing the famous, yet to be constructed, rules for quantum cosmology in
such a universe. Only the number of spins n is decided by the throw
of the dice. We then apply the anthropic argument. As theoretical
physicists, we would certainly ﬁnd an elegant mathematical model of
a Meta-theory more satisfying than the supreme being model. But
our inability to perform experiments for the values of n that are ruled
out by the anthropic argument, leaves us with no experimental proof
that the supreme being model is any less right than the mathematical
one. We must ask ourselves whether we are really doing science. So
must anyone who indulges in anthropic speculation. (Banks 2003,
p. 48).
How could we ever trust in such a theory as a fundamental description of nature?
Ensemble theories whose relevance for the observable phenomenology is mediated
exclusively by anthropic selectivity can not really be falsiﬁed. This is completely
unacceptable for a scientiﬁc theory:
Physics and Philosophy  2006  Id: 005 35
Reiner Hedrich: String Theory  From Physics to Metaphysics
The simple reason is that once a non-falsiﬁable theory is preferred
to falsiﬁable alternatives, the process of science stops and further in-
creases in knowledge are ruled out. (Smolin 2004, p. 5).
So, are there alternatives to anthropic reasoning with regard to the selection of
scenarios from the string landscape, or to the string landscape itself, or even to
string theory? Or is this simply the end?
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